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BARGAINING ORDERS
Labor Law-Bargaining Orders Without Election Interference
In recent years the courts1 and the National Labor Relations
Board' have struggled to establish standards for the issuance of bar-
gaining orders3 in situations in which unions seek recognition on the
basis of authorization card4 majorities. In Truck Drivers Local 413 v.
NLRB5 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed this
type of recognition demand and granted a bargaining order in response
to the employer's refusal to bargain although there had been no inter-
ference with the representation-election scheme of the Act.' As a re-
sult, -a union's ability to achieve recognition has been significantly en-
hanced.
The facts of the two cases consolidated in this opinion are very
similar. In Wilder Mfg. Co.' the union demanded recognition based
upon authorization cards from a majority of the employees.8 The em-
ployer, however, refused this demand, contending that the union did
not possess a true majority of the authorization cards. The employees
who had signed authorization cards then established a picket line and
later filed a charge alleging a violation of section 8(a)(5)9 of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.10  The trial examiner found that the em-
1. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. General
Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Wylie Mfg. Co., 417 F.2d 192
(10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
2. See, e.g., Schuckman Press, Inc., 181 N.L.R.B. 158 (1970); Davis Wholesale
Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 1 (1970); J.P. Stevens & Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 254 (1969). See also,
e.g., Doppelt & Ladd, Gissel Packing Company-The NLRB Applies the Standards, 49
CQn.-KENT L. REv. 161 (1972); Gordon, Union Authorization Cards and the Duty to
Bargain, 19 LAB. LJ. 201 (1968); Welles, The Obligation to Bargain on the Basis of
a Card Majority, 3 GA. L. Rrv. 349 (1969).
3. A bargaining order is a directive from the National Labor Relations Board or-
dering an employer to bargain with a union; see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575 (1969). A union can also gain recognition by the employer granting voluntary
recognition; see Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961); or
by a union victory in a Board election; see 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
4. See Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805, 807-20 (1969) (ex-
planation of the authorization card procedure).
5. 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
6. Id. at 1113.
7. 198 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 81 L.R.R.M. 1039 (1972).
8. Eleven of the eighteen employees in the unit had signed authorization cards.
487 F.2d at 1101.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1970) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,
subject to the provisions of section 159 (a) of this title."
10. Id. §§ 151-68.
1974] 1303
1304 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
ployer's conduct violated section 8(a)(5),11 but the Board, after two
previous considerations of the case,12 held that there could be no viola-
tion of section 8(a)(5) absent independent unfair labor practices"a
unless an employer had voluntarily agreed to determine majority status
of the union by a method other than Board election.' 4
In the companion case, Linden Lumber Division,"C the union de-
mand based on authorization cards was refused by the employer on the
theory that since the union had been organized by supervisors, recogni-
tion would result in a violation of section 8(a)(2).11 The union then
withdrew a previously filed representation petition, began a recognition
strike, and filed a section 8 (a) (5) charge. The trial examiner again
found that section 8(a) (5) had been violated, 7 but the Board, re-
jecting the expanded version of the independent knowledge test,18 did
not find a refusal to bargain on these facts. The Board thus held that
section 8(a)(5) applied in this situation only if the employer has vol-
untarily agreed to determine majority status by a means other than an
election. 19
The unions in both cases appealed, contending that the independ-
ent knowledge test was applicable and that the employer has a duty to
recognize the union when there is "convincing evidence" of majority
status. They argued that the recognition strikes provided the neces-
11. See 487 F.2d at 1101. The trial examiner also dismissed a charge based on
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1970), but this issue was not before the court on appeal. 487
F.2d at 1101 n.6.
12. In Wilder Mfg. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 214 (1968), the Board dismissed the section
8(a) (5) charge since the employer had neither rejected the collective bargaining princi-
ple nor interfered with the election process. The court of appeals remanded this deci-
sion for reconsideration in light of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969);
see Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 635 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam).
The Board in Wilder Mfg. Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 175 (1970), found a violation of section
8(a) (5) due to the employer's independent knowledge of the majority status of the union
and his unwillingness to resolve any doubts by a Board election. Following the Board's
decision in Linden Lumber Div., 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971), the Board's petition to re-
consider the first Wilder decision was granted; see 487 F.2d at 1103. The Board then
issued the decision which was appealed to the court of appeals in Truck Drivers.
13. Independent unfair labor practices refer to those other than violations of sec-
tion 8(a)(5) which are found in 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1)-(4) (1970).
14. 198 N.L.R.B. at--, 81 L.R.R.M. at 1041.
15. 190 N.L.R.B. 718 (1971).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2) (1970).
17. The trial examiner also found a violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970),
but the Board determined the violation was not serious enough to require a bargaining
order; 190 N.L.R.B. at 719. This finding was not challenged on appeal. 487 F.2d at
1105.
18. See text accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
19. 190 N.L.R.B. at 721.
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sary evidence to satisfy the independent knowledge standard. 21
To resolve these conflicting views, the court of appeals first looked
to section 9(a)21 which provides that the collective bargaining repre-
sentative be "designated or selected." Although this provision has
been interpreted to permit majority status to be determined by a means
other than an election,22 the court pointed out that elections are pre-
ferred by the Supreme Court and the Board.23 The court then stated
that section 9(c)(1)(B) 24 enables management to resolve any doubts
about a union's majority status by petitioning for an election, but it
does not provide an absolute right to an election.25  After tracing the
development of prior tests26 for issuing bargaining orders, the court
formulated a new standard which requires the employer either to recog-
nize the union or to petition for an election under section 9(o)(1)
(B).2 7  Since the employers in Truck Drivers had not used -the section
9(c)(1)(B) procedure, the court remanded with directions that a bar-
gaining order be issued.28
To analyze this decision properly, it is first necessary to consider
the prior standards used by the courts and the Board. The good faith-
20. 487 F.2d at 1106-07.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) provides: "Representatives designated or selected
for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit ap-
propriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees
in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .... "
22. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969).
23. 487 F.2d at 1107.
24. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (1970) provides:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regu-
lations as may be prescribed by the Board-
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organi-
zations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the rapresenta-
tive defined in subsection (a) of this section;
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide
for an appropriate hearing upon due notice.
25. 487 F.2d at 1110.
26. See text accompanying notes 29-39 infra.
27. 487 F.2d at 1113.
28. The court of appeals also rejected the union contention; see text accompanying
note 20 supra. The court of appeals quoted from Gissel, stating that the employer does
have a duty to recognize a union if "convincing evidence" of its majority support is
shown. 487 F.2d at 1106. The court examined the evidence which the union contended
was "convincing evidence" of majority support such as the recognition strike by a major-
ity of the employees and the statement by the management that ten or eleven employees
supported the union. It held that this evidence need not be treated as "convincing evi-
dence" by the Board. Id. at 1109.
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doubt test, adopted in Joy Silk Mills, Inc.,20 provided that an employer
could refuse to recognize a union if he had a good faith doubt about
the union's majority status. The Board could issue a bargaining order
only if the employer could not prove he had a good faith doubt or if
the employer's unfair labor practices could be used as evidence of his
bad faith. 0 This rule was modified in Aaron Brothers Co. 1 so that
the burden was placed upon the General Counsel of the Board to show
the employer's bad faith. However, in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 2
the Supreme Court stated that the Board had abandoned the good faith-
doubt test.33
The Board has also applied an independent knowledge test to de-
termine when a bargaining order is appropriate. According to this
doctrine, a bargaining order could be issued if the employer had know-
ledge, independent of the authorization cards, that a majority of the
employees supported the union. This test originated in Snow & Sons"4
where a bargaining order was entered because an employer dishonored
an agreement to recognize a union after the authorization cards had
been authenticated by a third party pursuant to an agreement.3 5 This
standard was expanded in Pacific Abrasive Supply Co.36 where a bar-
gaining order was issued although there had been no authentication
agreement. In that case independent knowledge was inferred because
the employer had verified the cards, had talked with employees who
favored the union and had observed a recognition strike by a majority
of the employees.37 In Truck Drivers the Board reinstated the more
restricted version of the independent knowledge standard as expressed
in Snow & Sons.3"
The Supreme Court in Gissel laid down a third standard for the
29. 85 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1949), enforced, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 914 (1951).
30. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 592-93 (1969). See also
Pegrebin, NLRB Bargaining Orders Since Gissel: Wandering From a Landmark, 46
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 193, 194-97 (1971).
31. 158 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966).
32. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
33. Id. at 594. During oral argument in Gissel, the Board announced it had aban-
doned the good faith-doubt test. Id.
34. 134 N.L.R.B. 709 (1961), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
35. See 487 F.2d at 1107-08; Comment, Employer Recognition of Unions on the
Basis of Authorization Cards: The "Independent Knowledge" Standard, 39 U. Cm. L.
REV. 314, 319-20 (1972); 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 731, 737.
36. 182 N.L.R.B. 329 (1970).
37. See 487 F.2d at 1108; Comment, 39 U. Cm. L. REv., supra note 35, at 320-
21; 1971 U. ILL. L.F., supra note 35, at 741.
38. 487 F.2d at 1108. See text accompanying notes 14 & 19 supra.
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issuance of bargaining orders. The Court held that a bargaining order
could be entered if the employer had destroyed the possibility of a fair
election by his unfair labor practices. 39  The Court, however, did not
specify what action should be taken absent election interference by
management, 40 and accordingly Gissel did not control the court of ap-
peals' decision in the present case.
The court of appeals could have decided the case on existing
precedents. Since there was no conclusive support for the contention
that a recognition strike constitutes sufficient evidence to support a
bargaining order,41 -the court was not compelled to adopt the union
position. The independent knowledge test,42 on the other hand, was
clearly a viable option since it had been applied in similar situations in
the past and had been reaffirmed by the Board in Wilder and Linden
Lumber. Nevertheless, the court chose to ignore the Board standard
and instead created its own test.
The decision by the court of appeals is not without merit. It pro-
vides certainty and ease of application since the only inquiry is whether
the employer did or did not petition for an election. As a result em-
ployers will be encouraged to use the 9(c)(1)(B) procedure to resolve
doubts about the majority status of a union demanding recognition on
the basis of authorization cards. Furthermore, the court's standard,
which is very similar to the union proposal in Gissel,4" will eliminate
tactics which were in the past used by employers to delay recognition.
In union petitioned elections the employer has often challenged the elec-
tion on the basis of the inappropriateness of the suggested unit. This
tactic resulted in a hearing conducted by the regional director of the
NLRB at which the employer could delay the election.44 However,
if the employer petitioned for the election, he could not request a hear-
39. 395 U.S. at 579. See Carson, The Gissel Doctrine: When a Bargaining Order
Will Issue, 41 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 85 (1972).
40. 395 U.S. at 595, 614; Christensen & Christensen, Gissel Packing and "Good
Faith Doubt": The Gestalt of Required Recognition of Unions Under the NLRA, 37
U. Cm. L. REv. 411, 423 (1970); 1972-73 Survey of Labor Relations Law, 14 B.C.
IND. & CoM. L. Rav. 1173, 1192 (1973); 1971 U. ILL. L.F., supra note 35, at 741.
41. See note 28 supra; text accompanying note 20 supra.
42. See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra.
43. The union in Gissel contended that when an employer is faced with a recogni-
tion demand based upon cards, he must recognize the union or petition for an election.
395 U.S. at 594-95.
44. Even under the court's standard, the employer could wait a long time before
filing his petition or could continuously propose frivolous units, but the Board could is-
sue a bargaining order due to such abuse of the election process or set definite time
limits for the petition to be properly submitted. See generally Excelsior Underwear,
Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
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ing since he must propose the appropriate unit."5 Faced with the em-
ployer petition, the union would perhaps waive any objections it might
have in order to avoid -the delay which a hearing would necessitate
since enthusiasm, and perhaps the election, could be lost due to the
ensuing postponement. 4" Accordingly, the result is an expedited elec-
tion process 47 which will separate those employers with real doubts from
those merely attempting to deny recognition to the union."
Nevertheless, the court of appeals' interpretation of section 9(c)
(1)(B) does not seem to comport with the literal wording of that pro-
vision.49 The language allows the employer to petition for an election,
but it does not require that he do so. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
in Gissel pointed out that section 9(c) (1) (B) was intended "to allow
them [the management], after being asked to bargain, to test out their
doubts as to a union's majority. . . ."50 The use of the word "allow"
is indicative of a permissive rather than a mandatory interpretation of
the section's purpose, and therefore the court of appeals' position ap-
pears unwarranted.
Since there is no direct precedent in support of the court's de-
cision, certain matters of policy must be considered in order to under-
stand the reasoning of the court and the Board. First of all, protection
of the employee's free choice in deciding upon a bargaining repre-
sentation is one of the primary purposes of the NRLA.91 Uncoerced
and unrestrained choice is especially important since a recognized union
acts as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit.62 To
achieve this purpose the Board seeks to maintain the "laboratory con-
ditions'"5 of the election process by utilizing the comprehensive set of
45. See Comment, 39 U. Cm. L. Rav., supra note 35, at 325-27. Of course if
the employer's unit proposal was outrageous, the regional director could suggest a change
without the necessity of a hearing, or the union could simply disclaim any interest in
that unit. The union could of course contest the unit and ask for a hearing which would
be a short proceeding since the union would limit the number of its objections. Id.
at 327.
46. Id. at 326-27.
47. There is a significant difference in the time required for a consent election
and one in which the election is contested. In a contested election an average of forty-
three days is required from the time the petition is filed until the regional director's
decision is made. In a consent election, the hearing is waived so that only three to
five days elapse between the petition filing and the agreement for the election. Thus
forty days are saved. Id. at 325 n.48.
48. Id. at 328.
49. See note 24 supra.
50. 395 U.S. at 599 (emphasis added).
51. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1970).
52. See id. § 159(a).
53. The Board seeks to provide conditions similar to those in a laboratory in order
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laws contained in the NLRA.11 Free choice by employees in deciding
whether they wish union representation should be an informed choice
after having heard the views of both the union and the employer. Or-
dinarily, however, an employee signs an authorization card without be-
ing exposed to the employer's position, and yet he is fully aware of the
union viewpoint as a result of organizational meetings, hand bill dis-
tributions, and other organizational activities.55 Thus the employee's
choice is made on the basis of information -from the union side only.
In addition to this one-sided exposure is the possibility of coercion,
forgery, and misrepresentation by the union.5 6 Therefore to enable the
employee to decide freely whether the union is desired, an election
should be held rather than the issuance of a bargaining order on the
basis of an authorization card majority 5 7
The preference for a Board election, rather than a card-based
bargaining order, when there has been no election interference was
pointed out by the Supreme Court in Gissel.55 The Supreme Court
also stated that elections help bring about industrial stability 0 because
a valid election, regardless of the outcome, prevents for a twelve month
period election petitions by rival unions or decertification by vote of the
employees.60 Congress has also demonstrated that the election process
is favored by amending the National Labor Relations Act in 1959 to
make it an unfair labor practice if an uncertified union engages in
recognition picketing unless an election petition is filed within a rea-
sonable period.6' Furthermore, the election process, even if initiated
by a union petition and contested by the employer, is a fairly quick
process and would certainly be more rapid than the legal proceedings
necessary to obtain a bargaining order.62
to determine the true desires of the employees. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124,
127 (1948); see Note, 75 YALE LU., supra note 4, at 823.
54. See 29 U.S.C. §§157-59 (1970).
55. See L. JACKSON & R. LEWIS, WINNING NLRB ELECTIONS 37 (1972); Lewis,
Gissel Packing: Was the Supreme Court Right?, 56 A.B.A.J. 877 (1970).
56. See Comment, 39 U. Cm. L. REv., supra note 35, at 318.
57. Of course, an election can also be tainted by coercion. Lesnick, Establishment
of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 MIcH. L. REv. 851, 866-67 (1967).
58. 395 U.S. at 601 n.18.
59. Id. at 599 n.14.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
61. Id. § 158(b) (7) (C). This provision has been held to be applicable to a ma-
jority union. International Hod Carriers Local 480, 135 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1962).
62. The Wilder case illustrates the inordinate length of time which may be required
when a bargaining order is sought. In Wilder the underlying facts and the complaint
charging the employer with a section 8(a) (5) violation took place in 1965-1966; 487
F.2d 1100-01. The dispute is not yet finally resolved. An election could have been
held in a much shorter period; see note 47 supra.
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Although the court purported to place emphasis on the preferred
election process, the result in Truck Drivers was a bargaining order
based on the unregulated solicitation of authorization cards.03  The
Board approach, on the other hand, actually favors the election process
because a bargaining order would not be as easily granted as under the
court standard. In fact, in situations similar to that of Truck Drivers,
the union would be free to petition for an election even if the employ-
er's actions rise to the level of a refusal to bargain. If the union wins
the election, it will be certified as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive."' If the union loses the election and the employer committed un-
fair labor practices which interfere with that election, the union will be
entitled to. a bargaining order."5 If the union loses the election with-
out unlawful interference by the employer, the union has been given a
fair chance to demonstrate its majority support by the more reliable
election process.
If it does become necessary to issue a bargaining order, the test
for its issuance should be designed to insure that the union actually rep-
resents a majority of the employees. Under the Board approach there
would be such evidence since according to the agreement between the
employer and the union, a third party would verify the card majority.0
Therefore, the Board could be confident that the union, which would
receive the benefit of the bargaining order upon breach of the agree-
ment by the employer, did enjoy the majority support of the employees.
Even if the standard used to grant a bargaining order was a showing
of "convincing evidence"0' 7 such as a recognition strike by a majority
of the employees, there would be some evidence of the union's majority
status. However, under the court's approach a bargaining order could
be issued merely upon a union demand for recognition based upon au-
thorization cards if the employer did not recognize the union or petition
for an election. Thus there would be no assurance, other than the un-
ion's alleged possession of authorization cards, that the majority of the
employees really wanted the union as their representative. Even if
majority status were required to be shown, it must be further decided
when to measure the purported union majority-at ,the time of the union
demand or at the time of the section 8(a)(5) proceeding-since the
63. See Note, 75 YALE L., supra note 4, at 823-28.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
65. See 395 U.S. at 579, 599-600.
66. 487 F.2d at 1107-08.
67. See note 28 supra; text accompanying note 20 supra.
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degree of employee support may well vary.68
The previous discussion has emphasized the protection of em-
ployee interests, but one must also consider the employer's interests
since the purpose of the NLRA is to protect management as well as
labor. 9 It is at least arguable that the right of the employer to present
his views to his employees is protected by -the first amendment r ° and
by section 8(c) 71 of the NLRA. However, the standard of the court
of appeals, which expands the instances in which a bargaining order is
permissible, inhibits the exercise of the employer's rights. Whenever
the employer is faced with authorization cards, he has difficulty in
presenting his own views to the employees because he often finds out
about the card campaign after it is well underway. 72 Furthermore,
a card campaign is more difficult to counter than an election since the
effort must be directed at individuals rather than groups of employees,
the union proposals are not clearly made known to the employer and
the campaign has no fixed time limit."
The court's test could also lead to increased harassment of em-
ployers by unions seeking recognition and a corresponding increase in
defensive employer petitions for elections in order to protect themselves
from bargaining orders. Conversely, the employer will be under
pressure to recognize a union on -the basis of a card demand because
the alternatives are not particularly attractive. The employer could
petition for an election, but he would not have the usual advantages of
a union petitioned election. Specifically, he could not obtain a pre-
election hearing at which to contest the proposed election, and the
election would take place more quickly.74 Alternatively, the employer
could refuse to bargain with the union, but that would bring about a
section 8(a)(5) proceeding and possibly an eventual bargaining or-
68. Employees may sign cards before they understand the employer's point of view,
and then change their minds after the employer's campaign is begun. Of course it is
possible for employees who have earlier refused to sign cards to decide later to support
the union.
69. The NLRA states that the employers, employees and unions should recognize
"one another's legitimate rights." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
70. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. See 2 J. JENKINs, LABOR LAW § 5.3, at 12 (1969).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970). See, e.g., NLRB v. Herman Wilson Lumber Co.,
355 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1966); Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 844 (6th Cir.
1962); Note, 75 YALE L.J., supra note 4, at 831. However the employer's right to free
speech is not without limit. See, e.g., NLRB v. Central Power & Light Co., 425 F.2d
1318 (5th Cir. 1970); Martin Sprocket & Gear Co. v. NLRB, 329 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.
1964); General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
72. See Note, 75 YALE L.J, supra note 4, at 831.
73. Id. at 832-34.
74. See note 46 supra; text accompanying note 45 supra.
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der. Faced with these options, the employer may well choose to rec-
ognize the union voluntarily, but even so he must take reasonable pre-
cautions to insure that the union has majority support to avoid viola-
tion of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(2). 75
Nevertheless, one could argue that the court's test actually in-
creases the employer's rights because it gives him an opportunity to
petition for an election even if he has independent knowledge of the
union's majority support .7  Although the court of appeals declined to
rule on this issue,77 undoubtedly it will have to be decided in the fu-
ture if the court's standard prevails. If the courts determine that the
employer can use section 9(c)(1)(B) even if he has independent
knowledge of the majority status, the union will not be entitled to a
bargaining order even if the employer breaches an agreement to rec-
ognize the union on the basis of authenticated authorization cards. If
it is held otherwise, the Board and courts will once again be required
to make an inquiry into the employer's state of mind, a task which has
proven to be extremely difficult in the past.7  Of course, this issue
would never have to be faced if the Board test were applied.
The Board test establishes three possible avenues leading to union
recognition: (1) a union petitioned election; (2) recognition pursu-
ant to an agreement between the parties providing for outside verifica-
tion of authorization cards; and (3) a bargaining order as a remedy
for breach of the agreement or for election interference. This plan
seems clearly preferable to the court's approach which, in spite of its
positive features, 79 has many inherent defects. Apparently, none of the
parties"0 were pleased with the court's plan since all parties petitioned
for certiorari.8 ' Since the Supreme Court has granted certiorari,
8 2 it
75. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731
(1961). See also Shea Chemical Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027 (1958).
76. See Comment, 39 U. Cm. L. RiEv., supra note 35, at 328.
77. 487 F.2d at 1111.
78. See Pogrebin, supra note 30, at 194.
79. See text accompanying notes 43-48 supra. The court assumes it aids the em-
ployees by protecting them, but this is no longer the case. In the early years of union
organization and growth in the United States, the unions did need the court's help in
preserving the rights of employees when dealing with the more powerful employers.
However, today the union movement is strong and the courts also should be concerned
about protecting the employees from the unions. See Rains, Authorization Cards as an
Indefensible Basis for Board Directed Union Representation Status: Fact and Fancy,
18 LAB. L.J. 226, 235 (1967).
80. It may seem strange that the union is not satisfied with this decision. How-
ever, it should be remembered that in its decision, the court did not adopt the union
view. See note 28 supra; text accompanying note 20 supra.
81. 42 U.S.L.W. 3471 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974).
82. Id. at 3594 (U.S. April 23, 1974).
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should reverse the holding of the court of appeals and order a determina-
tion consistent with the present Board view which more effectively carries
out the intent of the statute and more fairly protects the rights of em-
ployees and employers.8 3
WILLIAM ANDREW PARKER
83. The court of appeals decision is very important since section 10(f) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970), grants this court jurisdiction over a dispute in which
any party is aggrieved by a final order of the Board. Therefore any union involved
in such a dispute could appeal the case to this court and receive a bargaining order
on similar facts.

